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Abstract Much of the discussion regarding nano-
technology centers around perceived and prosphesied
harms and risks. While there are real risks that could
emerge from futuristic nanotechnology, there are
other current risks involved with its development,
not involving physical harms, that could prevent its
full promise from being realized. Transitional forms
of the technology, involving “microfab,” or localized,
sometimes desk-top, manufacture, pose a good op-
portunity for case study. How can we develop legal
and regulatory institutions, specifically centered
around the problems of intellectual property, that both
stimulate innovation, and make the best possible use
of what will eventually be a market in “types” rather
than “tokens”? This paper argues that this is the most
critical, current issues facing nanotechnology, and
suggests a manner to approach it.
Keywords Nanotechnology.Desktop
manufacturing.Intellectualproperty.
Typesandtokens.Microfabrication
From Feynman to Drexler
It is possible to see clear and broad trends in
technological advances looking back over the past
hundred or so years. General trends include ever
increasing efficiency in production and its tools, the
integration of computing and other technologies,
the classical truth of “Moore’sl a w ” which predicts
the doubling of computing power every 18 months,
and miniaturization. In some ways, all of these
trends are inter-related. In many ways, the chal-
lenges of the free market have driven all of these
trends. When new technologies are introduced, they
succeed or fail on the whim of consumers, and capital
investments are gambled with each new technological
roll-out. To increase profits and expand slim margins,
efficiencies in the tools of production can hedge the
bets of innovators without sacrificing potentially
profitable new technologies. Computing has helped
further expand margins in production by enabling
roboticsinmanufacturing, and inhelping to makebetter
products with more capabilities. The hyberbolic climb
of computing power only adds to these production
efficiencies,makingthe toolsofproductionincreasingly
smarter, faster, cheaper, and more energy efficient.
Miniaturization adds to all of these efficiencies.
Some people seem quite prescient, and able to
predict historical, economic, or technological trends
with uncanny accuracy. Gordon E. Moore, who
developed his famous law while working at Intel,
the truth of which has been borne out by history, is
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Nobel prize-winning physicist. In a lecture he gave at
the end of 1959 for the annual meeting of the
American Physical Society at Caltech, he stated:
I imagine experimental physicists must often look
with envy at men like Kamerlingh Onnes, who
discovered a field like low temperature, which
seems to be bottomless and in which one can go
down and down. Such a man is then a leader and
has some temporary monopoly in a scientific
adventure. Percy Bridgman, in designing a way to
obtain higher pressures, opened up another new
fieldandwas abletomoveintoitandtoleadusall
along. The development of ever higher vacuum
was a continuing development of the same kind.
I would like to describe a field, in which little
has been done, but in which an enormous
amount can be done in principle. This field is
not quite the same as the others in that it will not
tell us much of fundamental physics (in the
sense of, “What are the strange particles?”) but
it is more like solid-state physics in the sense
that it might tell us much of great interest about
the strange phenomena that occur in complex
situations. Furthermore, a point that is most
important is that it would have an enormous
number of technical applications.
What I want to talk about is the problem of
manipulating and controlling things on a small
scale.
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Feynman then described then theoretical techni-
ques now employed in electron miscroscopy to
manipulated individual atoms, the benefits of storing
large volumes of information at what we now call the
“nano-scale,” the nature of biological machineries that
are effectively nano-systems that “do things” rather
than simply store information, the potentials for
miniaturizing computers, and some of the physical
and technical challenges that would be faced before
these breakthroughs could be achieved. It was a
stunning moment in physics which all now recognize
as the beginning of an era. Yet in many ways, it was
also the necessary, incremental phase of something
that had been going on in technology for more than a
hundred years. All that Feynman did was coalesce
previously existing and visible trends in technology,
and predict their applicability and importance to future
technologies. In the 1990s, Eric Drexler expanded on
Feynman’s vision, and gave further theoretical validity
to the development of nanoscale manufacturing (the
holy grail of nanotechnology, by which anything might
be assembled atom-by-atom). Vernor Vinge described
the historical and inevitable convergence of technolo-
gies as the “singularity” and futurist Ray Kurzweil lays
out a graph like that of Moore’s law on which the
general trend of converging technologies is super-
imposed, again with uncanny accuracy.
Yet the trends in technology that Feynman and
Kurzweil, and numerous others correctly describe and
predict are not trends in a vacuum. As with all human
phenomena, all intentional ones at least, they are
driven by human needs and desires. As such they
follow the laws of economics, which is the science of
predicting markets in light of evolving needs and
desires. We should ask then not only what market
forces drive the trends of technological convergence,
but what drives these forces? We might also consider
the effects of converging technologies on future
markets will be, whether and to what degree those
effects will be disruptive, and how we might adapt in
ways that prevent the potential harms of significant
disruption, socially, culturally, and economically.
Many have considered the potential harms posed
by manufacturing at the nano-scale. Novels like
Michael Crichton’s Prey, and a famous essay by Sun
co-founder Bill Joy, “Why The Future Doesn’t Need
Us,” stoke both serious philosophical and ethical
debate, and public fears. The potential for individual,
physical harms from converging technologies is real,
and there are already instances of nano-scale materials
that have been developed and marketed although they
later turned out to be potentially harmful. But this is
true of every new technology. Bioetech faces similar
potentials for harm and abuse. Even coal and steam
technology helped alter our environment in potential-
ly harmful ways, if man-made contributions to the
greenhouse effect cannot be halted or reversed. While
we should consider the potential harms and how
institutions and principles might help prevent them,
the inevitability and potentially revolutionary good
that converging technologies pose argues that we
instead seek to effectively capitalize on them, guided
by our principles and concerns. We ought not to
1 Published first in Engineering and Science (1960), repub-
lished at http://www.zyvex.com/nanotech/feynman.html
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principle” that effectively set European investment
and development of genetically modified foods and
organisms back about a decade. Nor can we. The
nature of the trends that Feynman noticed more than a
half-century ago is that they are not only revolution-
ary in nature, but inherently democratic. Like com-
puter hobbyists who jumpstarted the modern PC
revolution by bucking the IBM mainframe model
and pursuing computing in garages and basements,
nanoscale manufacturing and its current precursors
are becoming accessible to those with modest invest-
ments in various tools.
The singularity is inevitable, and the only question
remains what will we do to be prepared for it? We
have some choices, made explicit through our prior
attempts to deal with technological revolutions. We
should consider our institutional and individual
responses in light of the great potential for good
posed by nanotechnology and its relatives.
The Technology Makes a Tiny Difference
Muchoftheliteratureanddiscussionofnanotechnology
rests upon an assumption that this is a radically
disruptivetechnologyunlikeothers,andthatthedangers
it poses have never been faced before. Thus, many of
thesedebatesinevitablyfocusonharmsandrisks.While
harms and risks are certainly something we should take
seriously, they are by no means the entire story of the
potential disruption posed by nanotechnology. Nor is
necessarily true that this disruption is unlike anything
we have seen before. Let’s put it in context. The context
begins with the industrial revolution and ends in the
nuclear age. At many stages of the development of
technology, all the way from cross-bow to H-Bomb, we
can point to what in science has been christened
“paradigm shifts,” involving tectonic changes in the
way we view the natural world. Except in technology,
these paradigm shifts mark changes in how we interact
with the natural world, and in how we both develop
and use artifacts (all man-made, concrete objects,
intentionally-produced).
At the beginning of the industrial age, the shift was
from individually-produced artifacts, manufactured
generally by individual craftsmen employing labor-
intensive processes. With industrialization came the
trend to employ labor in new ways, less for crafts and
more for pure muscle. As steam power freed up time
by speeding transportation, and freed up man-hours
by devolving some labor to machines, the artisan
class was replaced with a laboring class, and over
time this laboring class developed both wealth and
leisure time that encouraged the production of new
goods. industrialization marked a disruptive shift in
the relation of people to goods, markets and their
individual labor. It was not without controversy,
wringing of cultural-conservative hands, and vio-
lence. Luddism involved the actual destruction of
the new machines by those who opposed the societal
and economic changes brought about by industriali-
zation. Marx decried the alienation of individuals
from their own labor, and fomented revolutionary
sentiment that changed international politics for a
century. But the technology marched on.
Industrialization moved inevitably to mass-
production, and the paradigmatic factory production
line. The trend of distancing individual laborers from
creativity, and using them as more or less mere
operators of machines, continued through the 20th
Century. Unionization helped increase the price of
labor, and further encouraged the development of
machines that could help replace laborers. Mechani-
zation required computation, and the trends in
technology followed (or drove) trends in economics.
The shift in the 1970s and 80s from a manufacturing
economy to service economy was as inevitable as the
technological trends predicted by Feynman, Moore,
Drexler, Vinge and Kurzweil. But some of the
potential effects of these trends were not well-
predicted at all, and technological paradigm shifts
have sometimes been unpredictably liberating, even
as they were disruptive. Consider the computer
revolution on the 1980s and 90s. It was nothing like
that predicted by those who had captured what
amounted to the computer market at the time. When
IBM began selling business computers in the 1950s, it
estimated a market for only 50. It quickly had orders
for 70. Even in the 1970s, Ken Olsen, who was the co-
founder of Digital Equipment Corp (DEC), said “[t]
here is no reason for any individual to have a computer
in his home.” The same year saw Apple releasing its
groundbreaking personal computer the Apple II, which
had essentially been designed by Steve Jobs and Steve
Wozniak in a garage. Who knew?
In retrospect, the path of the computer revolution
was sewn into the fabric of the technology itself just
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move toward consuming less power, and so they must
become more efficient, and size matters for efficiency.
Speed increases too with efficiency, and what once
took a mainframe could be accomplished by ever
smaller transistors, which became what we now call
“chips.” Mass producing chips increased margins, and
greater availability pushed down prices. All of these
trends mimicked trends in each new disruptive
technology. Smaller, faster, better always created
tools that became more generally available. Moreover,
a certain overarching human need or desire pushed
computing to become a personal technology, and the
PC captured a need that never disappeared despite the
advent of the industrial age: the desire to create.
Steam locomotives lead to automobiles and motor-
cycles, mainframe computers lead to desktop PCs,
and the tools of production always tend to become
cheaper, smaller, and easier to use. These trends are
driving the precursor to nanotechnology which, when
fully realized, will finally make everyone who wishes
to design and produce new artifacts a potential factory
owner, just as the PC has made publishing, film-
making, and professional music recording accessible
as never before conceived. In a very real way, the
specific form of this new disruptive technology is not
remarkable, nor are the potentials it offers. We have
seen this before. But because nanotechnology will
finally merge materials with programming, and
authorship over the physical world, the nature of this
particular paradigm shift will make it felt at every
level. How can we prepare for it, and still enable it
full potential? Let’s look briefly at the state of the art,
and it real potentials as well as risks.
Current Policy and Nanotech
Because much of the public debate and media
attention paid so far to nanotechnology centers upon
risks, there have been various national attempts to
regulate the dangers of this technology by several
governments. There have also been numerous scien-
tific and public colloquia, conferences, and reports
drafted regarding risks and regulations. Books too
have been authored, ranging from a few monographs
to dozens of collections of essays detailing the various
ethical, social, and economic impacts of nanotechnol-
ogy, and in some cases proposing manners of
regulation and managing the coming revolution.
Meanwhile, in the U.S. there has only been sparse
and sporadic public engagement and public policy
initiatives to manage the transition toward converging
technologies. Europe, and especially the UK follow-
ing Prince Charles’s well-known public panic about
“grey goo,” have been more proactive. But in all
instances, focus has been mostly on risks and harms,
with little attention being paid to how to effectively
manage the inevitable transition to a new mode of
manufacturing, nor grappling with the social and
economic consequences without significant upheaval.
Questions that ought to be considered include: how can
innovation be encouraged and profitable when matter
becomes programmable? What will be the nature of
authorship and inventor-status, and how can these
statuses be protected. Should they be? To what extent
can the tools of production be regulated when they will
become ubiquitous, as computers have? Little attention
has been paid to these critical questions.
The regulations and discussions about risks are
important as a frame for much of the future debate.
While I am more optimistic about the promises
afforded by nanotechnology, I am realistic about its
risks. But realism means comparing risks with those
of past technologies, and taking into account the
reality of perceived versus actual risks over time. The
regulatory climate so far has reacted realistically, but
this should also imply that the scientific venture of
delving into true risks proceeds the same way.
Recently, concerns about the safety of certain nano-
materials have emerged from scientists’ own research,
proving that when it is not being manipulated by large
corporations, the institution of science can discover
risks and report them conscientiously. Specifically,
nanotubes are a promising new area of materials
research involving carbon structures designed at the
nanoscale, that have potentially useful qualities like
strength, flexibility, and conductivity. They also share
some qualities, it seems, with asbestos. Like asbestos
particles, which can burrow into tissues and cause
tumors, carbon nanotubes might have the same
potential. These and similar immediate concerns
about the health consequences of various nanomate-
rials that are being developed and released into the
marketplace are real and require further study. What is
encouraging is that unlike the experience with
asbestos, whose dangerous propensities were well-
known before the public was properly informed,
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wariness, are revealing dangers sooner rather than
later. This is encouraging unless the scale tips too far
to the other side, and unfounded panic supplants safe
innovation and responsible science. This is most
likely the case with public concern, and hand-
wriging by some notable public figures, regarding
the so-called “grey-goo” scenario and its potential to
destroy not just humanity, but the world.
Proposed first by Eric Drexler, in his book Engines
of Creation, it has been repeated by Bill Joy and other
doomsayers as a potential (or likely, in the case of Bill
Joy) consequence of converging technologies. The
scenarios posits that smarter, smaller, self-replicating
machines will either become uncontrollable by them-
selves, and self-replicate using every available piece
of matter on earth (until it is a mass of grey-goo), or
be manufactured to destroy everything by some mad-
scientist. This sort of nightmare scenario is not new to
technological prophesy, as each new technology has
at some point been heralded by both prophets and
publics as the end not just of an era, but of life as we
know it. So far it hasn‘t come true. Even nuclear
technology, which has not just the theoretical poten-
tial, but actual capability of wiping out the biosphere
of our planet, has somehow been contained by either
luck, or more likely, common sense and fundamental
ethics. Simply put, just because a technology has the
capability to be used for evil, does not mean the
technology should not be developed, nor that it must
necessarily or inevitably be used for evil. In the
meantime, since its inception, nuclear technologies
have been put to significant beneficial use, and
prospects remain promising for its future given the
threat of global warming from excessive greenhouse
gas production.
Nonetheless, in precautionary Europe, and in a
smattering of other places tending toward early and
expensive bureaucratic consideration of ethical con-
sequences and risks, numerous studies and rounds of
hearing have been conducted to try to rein in the grey-
goo scenario, no matter how historically unlikely it
may actually be. One positive development of media
attention and public fear has been its early dismissal
as a distraction (UNESCO 2006). Meanwhile, a
recent literature study has revealed:
…that as of 2008, seventeen of twenty-four
OECD countries surveyed (71%) had developed
dedicated strategies for nanotechnology at either
the national government and/or agency level.
The US, EU, and Australia all have named
nanotechnology strategies; the UK also has a
dedicated, though unnamed strategy.
2
Most of the studies being conducted, and regula-
tory frameworks being enacted, take realistic views of
the potential for cataclysmic consequences of run-
away nanotechnology. But to what extent will any
regulation or other public policy initiative be able to
ease the transition posed by such a disruptive
technology? If the form of the paradigm shift we
might expect from futuristic nanotech is correct, then
which regulatory or governmental approaches can
even begin to anticipate and prepare the public for
such changes? Moreover, should they?
I believe that the most relevant and immediately
necessary shift in policy that can help prepare the way
for a completely decentralized mode of production of
material goods would be alternation of our current
institutions surrounding intellectual property. It is the
disruption in economics, ownership, innovation, and
authorship, and our relations between us and our
artifacts, that will all be turned upside down by the
best case scenario of nanotechnology. Yet it is these
issues for which we are least prepared institutionally
to adapt. Let’s consider some of the Intellectual
Property consequences posed by nanotechnology,
and explore the hypothesis that this will be the first,
biggest hurdle to adopting the technology and
encouraging its development to full potential.
Intellectual Property: Unique Concerns of Nano
In the modern era, nothing has both hastened and
complicate the landscape of innovation the way that
the emergence of Intellectual Property has. Developed
at first by sovereigns (monarchs) as a tool to recruit
entrepreneurial activity, or inventive persons, into
their employ, Letters Patent and later Copyrights were
exclusive monopolies protecting various goods and
services and their authors or purveyors for a period of
2 Jennifer Pelley and Marc Saner, “International Approaches to
the Regulatory Governance of Nanotechnology”, RGI Report,
School of Public Policy and Administration at Carleton
University in Canada, 2008.
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entice pirates to become “privateers” (a fancy name
for legitimized piracy), by giving them a monopoly
over some of the spoils of their piracy for a given
time. Sir Francis Drake was employed this way to
help undermine the growing Spanish dominion over
the Caribbean and New World. Letters Patent evolved
slowly into modern patents. At first, they were
employed sporadically and less than predictably by
monarchs, and later they became part of entrenched
and more predictable state institutions. Their modern
forms are familiar: patent, copyright, and trademark.
The original intellectual property protection was
simply keeping some art, method of manufacture, or
invention a secret. Secret keeping is still used by
some innovators, where possible. It is cheap, and in
some cases quite effective. CocaCola® is a prime
example. This recipe has been kept successfully secret
for almost a hundred years. It is a valuable piece of
intellectual property. But the progress of the useful
arts and sciences are stifled by secret keeping, and it
ensures that potentially useful information never
enters the public domain except by independent
discovery or invention. This is why intellectual
property laws were created: to encourage innovation,
and ensure that the fruits of invention move into the
public domain… eventually.
The monopolies embodied in patent and copyright
laws expire after a specific period of time, and the art
or invention that was once monopolized becomes
common property. Once knowledge moves into the
public domain, it can be freely exploited by anyone.
For a couple hundred years, the distinctions between
types of objects, and thus the sort of intellectual
property protection afforded, were clear. Copyrights
were for written works, then eventually paintings,
photographs and films. Patents were for inventions.
The distinction between inventor and author seemed
clear enough. Authors created writings, inventors
created tangible objects that did things, or helped us
to do things. But recently, this distinction has begun
to dissolve.
It was actually software, or what we now broadly
call Information, Communication Technology (ICT),
that began to undermine the traditional categories of
intellectual property (IP) law. When software for
digital computers first began to be exploited for
profits (free software had been the norm for some
time, or trade secrets), patents were the first means of
protection that programmers sought. This was partly
because copyright law used to prohibit granting
protection to any form of an “expression” that could
not be directly perceived by humans. Because the
“direct perception” requirement meant that vinyl LPs
(records that spun on turntables, your parents might
own a few), and audio tapes could not be copyrighted.
The law was changed in the early 70s to eliminate this
requirement, and then software became copyrightable.
Suddenly, however, IP met a metaphysical crisis. The
categories of patent and copyright had previously
been mutually exclusive, meaning one could not
patent something that was “expressive” and one could
not copyright something that was “useful.” Either the
nature of these categories was suspect, or software
was a “hybrid” object of some type.
Ih a v ea r g u e di nm yb o o kThe Ontology of
Cyberspace,
3 and elsewhere, that software revealed
that the original distinction between copyrightable
and patentable objects was arbitrary. The realm of
objects covered by IP includes all “man-made objects,
intentionally produced,” each of which is an expres-
sion of an idea, and each of which falls somewhere on
a spectrum of uses ranging from primarily aesthetic to
primarily utilitarian. Even while software revealed
this error, which I will expand on and continue to
defend later, nanotechnology will finally reveal that
our notions of authorship, intention, and object need
to be revised to properly deal with the potentials and
prospects of converging technologies.
Because nanotechnology, both in the emerging
forms of distributed manufacturing which I will
discuss later, and in its future application as a form
of molecular manufacturing, involves the sale and
distribution not of the final object themselves, but of
the “type.” The type/token distinction in logic, which
is mirrored in the “idea/expression” distinction in IP
law, correctly notes the divergence of abstract entities
(like the idea of a chair, or the number three) from
instances in the world of each. IP protection can only
extend to the tokens and not the types. Thus, no one
could patent the idea of a chair, but only if it is
instantiated in specific forms of chairs (if they are
new, non-obvious, and useful). Once one receives a
patent for a new, non-obvious, and useful object, the
3 The Ontology of Cyberspace: Law, Philosophy, and the
Future of Intellectual Property (Chicago: Open Court 2000).
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posessory like that given to property-holders. You
cannot lay claim to any of the tokens out there of the
patented object. Instead, you can prevent others from
creating and selling instances of the type protected,
unless they pay some royalty. It is an exclusionary
right. The same holds true for copyright. The
copyright I automatically have on the words on this
page prevents others from copying or reproducing
them without paying me some royalty. All of which
raises interesting questions of how any of these rights
will be applied to objects that will essentially be
distributed as types rather than tokens. What will
count as authorship of nanotechnology-based objects,
how will authors (inventors) of these objects be
rewarded? How can the promise of these technologies
be realized despite the difficulties of applying
traditional IP to their products? All of these vital
issues are already confronting emerging precursors of
true nanotechnology. Developing new models of
protecting IP, and applying them to distributed
manufacturing in its present and eventual forms, will
serve both the needs of economic justice and ensure
greater, more democratic means of innovation.
Ethical, Policy, and Social Implications of Future
Nanotech
Disruptive technologies, as I have sketched above, are
nothing new. A new and potentially useful trend,
however, is approaching the ethical, legal, and social
implications of disruptive technologies methodically.
Although we can never accurately predict the full
impact of any new development, whether it’sa n
artifact, political system, or new mode of behavior
expressed through a technology, we can attempt to
address new conditions as they arise. Nanotechnology
is giving us that opportunity, even as software and the
growth of the internet have done so recently.
Major ethical, political, and social concerns raised
by nanotech still center largely around two main
themes recognized by others who are researching this
field and its implications: risks and justice. I am
particularly interested in Justice. Specifically, the
promise of nanotech to achieve technologically what
no political system ever could: the end of scarcity. In
theory, pretty much any thing we need could be
manufactured locally at the molecular level, saving
tremendous amounts of energy, relieving us of the
environmental and economic impact of transportation,
and providing everyone with not only the bare
necessities, but what we consider to be luxury items.
Standards of living could rise exponentially in the
poorest areas, medicines could be manufactured
where and when they are needed in devices that
could be accessible to anyone. The dream of
molecular manufacturing includes the ability of
“nanofactories” being able to reproduce themselves.
The only input required would be some feed source,
likely carbon, which can be manipulated into count-
less forms for any conceivable function. Other feed
sources include the molecules in the air around us,
and in our waste products, all of which can
conceivably be reconfigured, reassembled, and put
to use. The technology alone is revolutionary. But
when you begin to think of the economic and social
implications of such a world, the term “revolution” is
more or less literal.
Our current economic system is built on concep-
tions of scarcity, needs, labor, and capital that have
fed the specialization of labor, and current manufac-
turing and distribution paradigms for centuries. All of
which would be undone if the promise of nanotech-
nology is achieved. Money would mean nothing.
Surplus would mean nothing. Capital would be
unnecessary, assuming that the most common mate-
rial used in molecular manufacturing will be carbon,
which is ubiquitous and can be manipulated into
many forms for numerous purposes. Ideas would
become the only thing standing between desires and
goods. reconfiguring our economic system to deal
with this kind of revolution is the major challenge we
face. All of it hinges upon rethinking the relations
between innovators, consumers, ideas, and products.
Technologies have altered our conceptions of class,
and proved to be disruptive to both societies and their
economies. The industrial age and the computer age
are two major examples. In each case, large numbers
of people saw old ways of life replaced by new ones.
Along the way, some people suffered. Some people
never adapted. In each case, the control of these shifts
was in the hands largely of those with the capital to
invest in new technologies, and political influence to
encourage the adoption of those technologies. The
profits realized accrued to everyone, to some extent.
But classes still existed, and in some ways became
more distinct. Overall wealth has increased, but we
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The “middle class” has grown over time, but large
gaps in standards of living remain in the industrialized
and now computerized world, and between the
“developing” world and the “developed” world.
The promise of nanotechnology, taken to its logical
extreme, clearly will upset the established order.
Scarcity is part of the engine that drives profits, and
desires and needs unmet create markets for those who
wish to profit by meeting them. There is considerable
risk that those who stand to lose their treasured place in
society, and economic advantage over others, will
somehow attempt to either prevent the full promise of
nanotechnologyfrombeing achieved, ordelay ittotheir
advantage. While most of our focus on ethics, society,
and nanotechnology has been on potential harms and
risks, the greatest danger is that these fears will be
manipulated in the public debate to centralize control
over naotechnology’s applications, to prevent the full
democratic and economically liberating potential of
molecular manufacturing, and ensure that the status quo
is not disturbed. But it is the nature of the technology, as
with ICT, that it cannot finally be contained. Advances
willbeachievedwithorwithoutregulation,andtheonly
remaining issue will be whether public policy can be
guidedfairlytohelpachieveit,orwhetheritwillbeused
asameanstotrytocriminalizethosewhoareattempting
to deliver its full potential.
This is, of course, the same thing that is happening
in ICT. Peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies are a boon to
distribution of media, but they got out of control. The
media producers, or at least the large, consolidated
ones, saw their tight control over the distribution of
their copyrighted works slip away as P2P programs
allowed the rapid sharing of large files as “torrents”
over the internet. What might have been embraced as
an efficient, convenient, and even potentially profitable
means of brining media to more people (perhaps at a
reasonable cost) has become the focus of efforts to
criminalize it. This likely mirrors what will happen
with futuristic nanotechnology. The question is, can
public policy and those who want to distribute the
products of their creativity figure out a way to embrace
the technology rather than attempt to stifle it?
Some people are already beginning to create tools
that are intermediate steps between now and the nano-
future. These tools are first steps. They include
machines that can fabricate locally pretty much any
form one can conceive of. There are still tremendous
technical limitations, and decades worth of research
and development necessary before true molecular
manufacturing can be done, but these tools are
beginning to raise the questions posed above.
The Nano-Now: What’s Currently Happening
in Micro-Manufacturing and Nano
We won’t have to wait until the distant future to
discover the complications that arise when innovators
decide to try to profit from their creations using
distributed manufacturing. There are already nascent
forms of nanotechnology, what we might call “micro-
fab” for now, that are already in various stages of
development. These developing technologies pose
opportunities now to explore the issues raised above
about authorship, ownership, and innovation.
Among the examples of current and developing
microfab technologies is the “FabLab” effort. Devel-
oped out of Neil Gershenfeld’s course at MIT entitled
“How to Make Anything (Almost),” the idea behind
FabLabs is to create the minimal functional toolset for
fabricating just about anything, assuming one can get
hold of the raw materials. From the fabLab website:
Fab labs share core capabilities, so that people and
projects can be shared across them. This currently
includes:
– A computer-controlled lasercutter, for press-fit
assembly of 3D structures from 2D parts
– Al a r g e r( 4 ′x8′) numerically-controlled milling ma-
chine, for making furniture- (and house-) sized parts
– A signcutter, to produce printing masks, flexible
circuits, and antennas
– A precision (micron resolution) milling machine
to make three-dimensional molds and surface-
mount circuit boards
– Programming tools for low-cost high-speed em-
bedded processors
These work with components and materials opti-
mized for use in the field, and are controlled with
custom software for integrated design, manufacturing,
and project management. This inventory is continu-
ously evolving, towards the goal of a fab lab being
able to make a fab lab.
4
4 http://fab.cba.mit.edu/about/faq/ (Retrieved June 10, 2009).
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program, are the same as those embraced by those who
are developing molecular manufacturing. Gershenfeld
himself has embraced these goals, but he and his team
have,inthemeantime,createdalarge-scaleversionofthe
concept. While FabLabs require users to have some skill
in using the tools, the idea has liberated creativity in
previously unlikely areas. Setting up a FabLab costs
about 60,000 USD, and runs on open source software.
FabLabs now exist on nearly every continent, and in 90
locations worldwide. These FabLabs are an exciting
possible front in the war that will inevitably envelop
nanotech as it did ITC: the battle between corporate/state
control, and grassroots sharing of a “commons.”
There are other, smaller efforts underway. Desktop
manufacturing is the ultimate goal, and so some are
creating simple 3D “printers” that can craft compo-
nent parts out of various plastics or other similarly
moldable materials. Among these efforts is the
Fab@Home project. This is an open source project
(meaning that the IP is not controlled by any one
person, and cannot be), which aims to develop a
simple yet robust 3D printer to fabricate models from
Computer Aided Design templates. The Fab@Home
website contains a clarion call for the type of
revolution I have discussed above:
Ubiquitous automated manufacturing can thus
open the door to a new class of independent
designers, a marketplace of printable blueprints,
and a new economy of custom products. Just
like the Internet and MP3’s have freed musical
talent from control of big labels, so can
widespread RP (Rapid Prototyping) divorce
technological innovation from the control of
big corporations.
5
Another promising effort is called “RepRap”
project. This is an attempt to build a truly self-
replicating machine that can also rapidly prototype or
fabricate any other type of part. The first iteration is
called “Darwin 1.0,” and the next planned version is
being called “Mendel.” So far, RepRap can manufac-
ture 60% of its own parts. The stated goals of RepRap
echo those of FabLabs and Fab@Home. As with all
of these efforts, there is a utopian goal of being able
to democratize manufacturing and thus liberate
intellectual capital in all corners of the world.
what the RepRap team are doing is to develop
and to give away the designs for a much cheaper
machine with the novel capability of being able
to self-copy (material costs are about €500).
That way it’s accessible to small communities in
the developing world as well as individuals in
the developed world. Following the principles
of the Free Software Movement we are distrib-
uting the RepRap machine at no cost to
everyone under the GNU General Public Li-
cense. So, if you have a RepRap machine, you
can use it to make another and give that one to a
friend...
6
These are all lofty goals, and inspired by utopian-
ism of the best kind. The promise of the technology is
clearly the elimination, eventually, of scarcity, and the
fulfillment of human needs without the pitfalls of the
present economic system (again, eventually). As The
Guardian reported about the RepRap: “it has been
called the invention that will bring down global
capitalism, start a second industrial revolution and
save the environment—and it might just put Santa out
of a job too.”
7 The same article quoted the founder of
Project Gutenberg (which posts public domain con-
tent on the internet for free download by anyone)
Michael Hart, who properly notes:
In 30 years replicators are going to be able to
make things out of all sorts of stuff,“ he said.
”Somewhere along this line the intellectual
property people are going to come in and say
‘No we don’t want you all printing out Ferraris
and we don’t want you printing out pizzas’.”
8
What remains missing is the institutional blueprint—
the public policies that would need to be embraced, to
make this dream become a reality, and to ensure that it
leads to a virtuous circle of profit for all. While MP3s
have created new opportunities for some artists, there is
no doubt that others are “losing” profits they had
expected to receive from their works. Large organiza-
5 http://fabathome.org/wiki/index.php?title=Fab%40Home:
Overview (Retrieved June 10, 2009)
6 http://reprap.org/bin/view/Main/WebHome (Retrieved June
10, 2009)
7 Nov 25, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2006/nov/
25/frontpagenews.christmas2006 (Retrieved June 10, 2009)
8 Ibid
Nanoethics (2009) 3:157–166 165tions representing artists, like the RIAA, have fought to
regulate the rapid spread of illicit copies of recorded
works through P2P networks. Imagine the fight thatwill
erupt if someone posts the complete design specifica-
tions of an iPod, and people begin manufacturing them
athomeontheirdesktops.Thisistheinflectionpointwe
stand upon: the balance between the great potential,
liberating promise of the technology, and the threat this
poses to established ways of doing business.
An Outline for the Investigation
Preparing for the future of nanotech requires revisit-
ing some first principles, and then delving into how
we might alter currently accepted forms of behavior
to meet emerging needs. This approach combines
both theory and practice, and I have done this before
w i t hb o t hI C Ta n dg e n e s .
9 The first principles
involved are those that we use to relate people to
both ideas and objects. They underlie our beliefs that,
for instance, x is P’s idea, and thus P has some claim
or right to use the idea in various media. We should
look carefully then at the relations of authors to
artworks, inventors to artifacts and inventive process-
es, and the nature of all these, as well as of ideas,
abstract entities, natural laws, and related objects and
concepts. Sorting out how we ought to deal with
property or profit in nanotechnology requires first
coming to grips with the pre-legal relations we might
have to all of the objects and actors involved, then
deciding which laws fit the ontology we discover
best, and suit our needs most fully.
To do this, we must first look in depth at the
technology, from its theoretical inception, to its
current forms, including nascent microfab attempts
at the grassroots to realize futuristic nanotech. We
must then look at the current state of regulation,
institutions, and laws, and consider their effectiveness
for dealing with the sort of disruption envisioned.
Finally, we should look carefully at the nature of
property relations, intellectual property, ideas, and
people. It is here that we will pave the path for a new
way of encouraging innovation. The technological
revolution we can foresee contains within it a
revolutionary new mode of approaching theories of
intellectual property, although perhaps this conun-
drum isn’t so new. Perhaps once again, limitations in
the law are being revealed by a new technology, but
those limitations were always there.
Nanotech gives us an opportunity to reconsider old
concepts and explore new forms of relating innova-
tors, authors, and their creations in ways that both
encourage innovation, and promise mutual benefit
without governmentally-supported monopolies. Ulti-
mately we will see that nanotechnology involves the
convergence not just of every other technology, but
also of world-views. In it lies the germ of an idea that
political systems have failed to fulfill: the end of
scarcity. It also contains the potential to liberate an
instinct that has been necessary for only a limited
class of people since the beginning of the industrial
era: the creative instinct. When labor became special-
ized, only a few needed to be innovators, and capital
went to those who could raise it on the strength of
their good ideas… sometimes. Many failed. Good
ideas alone don’t always succeed, as capital has
remained relatively scarce for seeing an invention
through to success in the marketplace. Now, with the
promise of nanotechnology, and its present iterations
in microfab, we might be able to revive the creative,
artisan instinct we lost when a broad skill-set became
unnecessary. If we can recalibrate, or replace our
present institutions, chuck IP law as we know it, and
devise a new paradigm for innovation and profit, we
just might succeed.
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